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SUMMARY
Although  agriculture  is  weakening  as  a force  in  domestic  politics,
the potential of agricultural  policy is growing in the area of our foreign
policy.  Taken together,  high  costs  of controlling  farm  surpluses,  con-
centration  among  the  few  of  benefits  from  governmental  price  sup-
ports, potential  surpluses  that overhang the market,  and the dilemmas
of price  policy and  acreage  diversion  all constrain  farm politicians  to
seek control of foreign markets  and  foreign  policy  in order to  obtain
relief from agriculture's domestic woes. Counterforce  may soon  compel
a  search  for  ways  to  put our  agricultural  science  to  effective  use  in
nations that so desperately need  it.
Among  the most  critical issues  of foreign  policy  is  the  American
effort to help developing  countries grow economically,  improve human
conditions,  and increase  chances  for constitutional  democracies.  Here
agricultural  policy  and  politics  can  do  much,  if  we  work  for  major
changes in the agricultural  aspects  of our foreign policy.
We  should  move  more  vigorously  and  systematically  than  ever
to project  our  agricultural  sciences  into  the  developing  countries  and
to  follow  these  with  related  disciplines  from  our  universities.  In  this
effort,  we  should begin  with  agriculture  because  of  the obvious  need
of developing  countries  for more  food, food, food  for people,  people,
people.
We  have  long  sent  our  career  diplomats  abroad.  We  also  extend
abroad  our  military  establishments  through  career  officers  on  ad-
visory  missions.  It  is  time  that  we  match  our  diplomats  and  our
military  efforts  with  an  international  career  service  representing  the
peaceful  arts.  Thus,  if  the  waning  of  traditional  farm  power  speeds
and  nourishes  the  growth  of  a  new  public-private  enterprise  abroad,
rooted  in  the  great  institutions  of  this  country,  it  will  enlarge  the
scope  and  purpose  of  these  institutions.  Along  with  diplomats  and
military  officers  we  will  then  have  educators  abroad  in  force  as  a
career  service  with  their  links  intact  to  their  own  faculties,  schools,
and universities to which  they will periodically return.  This will enable
us  to  employ  the  powerful  political  base  which  already  exists  in  the
81university  establishment  in  this  country  to  project  abroad  the  arts
of peace.
Let me develop  the  argument.
THE DECLINE  OF AGRICULTURE  IN DOMESTIC  POLITICS
In  1962  the  U.  S.  Supreme  Court  ruled  that  the  manner  of
reapportionment  of  the  Tennessee  General  Assembly  denied  rights
guaranteed  by the  14th Amendment  to  the Constitution  of the  United
States.  In  striking  down  Georgia's  apportionment  of  Congressional
seats  early  in  1964,  the  court  announced  the  standard  of  "one  man,
one  vote";  and  in  June  of  1964,  the court  laid  down  that  "the  seats
of  both  houses  of  a  bicameral  state  legislature  must  be  apportioned
on  a population  basis."'  In August  1965,  Senator  Everett  McKinley
Dirksen  could  not  persuade  two-thirds  of  the  Senate  to  approve  an
amendment  which  would  permit  states  to  choose  through  referenda
to apportion one house  of their legislatures  on the  basis  of a standard
other than "one  man,  one  vote."
It  is  virtually  certain  that  efforts  to  reverse  the  judicial  revolu-
tion  in  apportionment  have  failed.  Thus  the  old  interests  are  going
and  new  interests  are  vesting  in  their places.
How  much  will  reapportionment  reduce  the  political  power  of
rural  areas?  Congressman  Jamie  Whitten  (D.,  Mississippi)  declared
that  the  Georgia  case  would  result  in  the  transfer  of  27  House  of
Representatives  seats  from  rural  to  city  areas.  "This  will,  of  course,
have  the  effect  of  reducing  those  with  rural  or  agricultural  districts
by  what  amounts  to  54  votes."  Using  the  1960  census  the  Congres-
sional Quarterly calculated  that apportionment  of Congressional  seats
in  each  state  would  cause  a  net  loss  of  12  seats  in  "rural  areas,"
which  includes  small towns  and cities  up to  50,000. The  loss  is there-
fore  considerable.
Reapportionment  of  state  legislatures  will  result  in  much  more
significant  shifts  in their power  bases than Congressional  redistricting.
The  David-Eisenburg  calculation  found  that  in  1960  the  relative
"value  of  the  vote"  for  representatives  in  state  legislatures  compared
with  100  as  average,  was  168  for  counties  under  25,000  in  popula-
tion  and 77  in counties  of 500,000  or more.  The  most  rural counties
enjoyed  more  than  twice  the  legislative  representation  of  the  most
urban counties.
The  rural  farm  population  continues  to  decline.  Between  1954
1Charles  M.  Hardin,  "Issues  in  Legislative  Reapportionment,"  Review  of  Politics,
Vol. 27,  No.  2  (April  1965),  pp.  147-72.
82and  1964  the  number  of  farms  fell  from  nearly  4.8  million  to  less
than  3.5  million.  The  USDA  predicts  a  further  drop  in  farm  num-
bers to 2.6 million  by 1970,  and this decline will  probably  be quickly
translated  into  a  loss  in political  influence  by reapportionments  after
1970.  Until  the  revolution  in  reapportionment,  the  net  outmigration
from  the  farms normally  did  not result  in  a  corresponding  change  in
legislative  reapportionment.  Indeed,  those remaining on farms  usually
gained  because  fewer  persons  typically  elected  the  same  number  of
state  legislators.  This  "unearned  increment"  of  politics  will  presum-
ably disappear.
Shifts  in  population  have  already  diminished  the  rural  farm
political  strength  in  Congress;  however,  the  loss  is  not  as  great  as
we  sometimes  are  led  to  believe.  Much  strength  has  rested  on  the
entrenchment  of farm-based  Congressmen  in formal positions  of pow-
er  in the House  of Representatives.  The  historical  loyalty of  Southern
voters  has  done  much  to  insure  long  tenures  of  Southern  Congress-
men who,  following  the  seniority  principle  which  is  the  "iron  law  of
oligarchy"  of  Congress,  have  moved  inexorably  into  the  seats  of
power.
In  a  tribute  to  Congressman  Whitten,  Chairman  of  the  Agricul-
tural  Subcommittee  of  the  House  Committee  on  Appropriations,
Congressman Natcher  said:  "This  (Agricultural  Appropriations)  bill
has  become  a rather  difficult  bill  to present  to  the  . . . House.  ...
We  have  an  able  chairman  on  this  committee,  and  if  that  were
not the  situation,  we would be  in difficulty  every  year  that we present
this  bill."  Mr.  Whitten  noted  that  perhaps  the  greatest  service  he
had  ever  done for  agriculture  was  getting  Mr.  Cannon  to put him on
the  Public  Works  Subcommittee  of  the  Committee  on  Appropria-
tions-"so the  other  members  realized  they  couldn't  kick  agriculture
around without  having  to  face  me on the other  committee."
Mr.  Whitten's  influence  extends  beyond  public  works  to  defense
appropriations.  In  a  controversy  with  Congressman  Leggett  (D.,
California)  over  price  supports  for  cotton,  Congressman  Whitten
noted  that  Congressman  Leggett  was  a member  of the  Armed  Serv-
ices  Committee  and  added  ".  ..  you  [in  California]  get  about  half
the  Federal  contracts  in  defense."  "It  seems  to  be  a  diminishing
amount  all  the  time,"  said  Congressman  Leggett,  "We  are  fighting
that."  Mr.  Whitten  replied:  "I  deal  with  that  on  the  armed  services
appropriations."  "I  know,"  said  Congressman  Leggett.
The  organization  of  power  revealed  in  part  in  these  comments
has  been  formidable.  It  is  reasonable  to attribute  to  it  a  large  part
of  the  considerable  success  that  agriculture  has  enjoyed  in  securing
83federal  appropriations.  Nevertheless,  the  power  of  agriculture  in  the
formal  structure  of  the  House  seems  to  be  declining.  In  1958  the
Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives  and  twelve  of  the  most
powerful  House  committee  chairmen  hailed  from  districts  which
were  35  percent  rural  farm  when  the  nation  was  only  15.3  percent
rural  farm.  In  1964  Congressmen  holding  the  same  positions  were
from  districts  which  were  only  17  percent  rural  farm,  while  national
rural farm  population  was  8.7  percent.2
The  loss  of agricultural  influence  in  the  nation's  politics  may  also
explain  the  recent  transfers  of  five  Democrats  from  the  Committee
on Agriculture  "to more  prestigious  committees."
Finally,  the  signs  of  instability  in  the  traditional  loyalty  to  the
Democratic  party  on  the  part of  Southern  rural  voters  could  greatly
accelerate  the  decline  of agriculture's  political  position  in  Congress.
The  growing  strength  of  the  Presidency  hardly  needs  arguing.
Presidential  dependence  upon  metropolitan  majorities,  heavy  at  pres-
ent, will  grow.  In  making his  case for  a Department  of Urban  Affairs
in the  Cabinet,  President  Johnson  said  that  80  percent  of Americans
will  live in  cities by the  year 2000.
The  last  item  in  this  catalogue  of apparent  losses  or  weaknesses
in agriculture's  political position  is  the continuing  conflict  over  policy
between  the  American  Farm  Bureau  Federation  on  the  one  hand,
and  on  the  other,  the  USDA,  the  National  Farmers  Union,  and  in-
creasingly,  the  Grange.  Divisions  within  agriculture  are  not  new.
Despite  the  "agricultural  bloc"  of  the  1920's  and  its  considerable
success,  effective  passage  of  farm  legislation  awaited  not  only  the
coming  of  the  New  Deal  but  also  the  "union  of  cotton  and  corn"
in  the  Farm  Bureau.  It  might  be  plausibly  argued  that  the  accent
upon  commodity  programs  since,  say,  1938  has  stimulated  a  prolif-
eration  of commodity  groups  both  as  independent  organizations  and
also  within  the  general  farm  organizations,  especially  the  Farm
Bureau.
Charles  L.  Clapp  has  published  a  book,  The  Congressman: His
Work  as He Sees  It,  based  upon  discussions  with  and  among  Con-
gressmen. He quotes  Congressional  opinion:
"Charles  M.  Hardin,  "Farm  Political  Power  and  the  U.  S.  Governmental  Crisis,"
Journal of  Farm Economics, Vol.  40,  No.  5  (December  1958),  pp.  1646  ff.  Com-
pare  the  map  showing  location  of  the  formal  leadership  of  the  House  and  Senate
in  Special  Report,  "Congressional  Reform,"  Congressional Quarterly, June  7,  1963,
p.  881.
84The  farm  bloc  is  split  into  wheat  blocs  and  cotton  blocs  that  don't
work  together.  The peanut  bloc  is  split  up  into  the  runner,  the  south-
west  Spanish,  and  the  Virginias.  The  wheat  bloc  is  splitting  up  by
classes  of  wheat.  The  cotton  people  are  split  between  the  old  cotton
growing  part  of the  South,  the Texas  group,  and  the  California  group,
and  the  three  can  never  get  together  any  more.  The  Texas  group  is
even  split-one  area  is  in  the  new  part,  and  central  Texas  is  all  for
the  Old  South.
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Richard  E.  Fenno,  Jr.,  writes:
The  conditions  of  committee  influence  vary.  Members  [of  Con-
gress]  are likely  to defer  to a  committee,  for example,  when the  issues
are  technical  and  complicated,  when  large  numbers  do  not  feel  per-
sonally  involved,  or  when  all  committee  members  unite  in  support  of
the  committee's  proposals.  . . Conversely,  members  are  less  likely
to  defer  to the  judgment  of  a  committee  when  the  issue  is  of  a  broad
and  ideological  sort,  where  national  controversy  has  been  stirred,  or
where  the  committee  is  not  unanimous.  These  latter  conditions  fre-
quently  mark the  work of  the Committee  on  Education  and  Labor  and
on  Agriculture.
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These  appear,  then,  to  be the factors  in the  loss  of farm  political
power:  migration  from  farms,  reapportionment,  fewer  strategic  posi-
tions  in  the  formal  power  organization  of  Congress,  the  lessened
loyalties  of  Southern  rural  voters  for  Democratic  Congressmen,  the
continued  enhancement  of  the  executive  power  over  the  Congres-
sional,  and  the  growth  of  struggles  within  the  agricultural  interest,
in and out of Congress.  What  factors may be  listed on the other side?
In 1965  passage  of the omnibus farm bill through the  House may
have been  attributable  to an  arrangement  in  which rural Democratic
Congressmen  supported  repeal  of  Section  14(b)  of  the  Taft-Hartley
Act,  the  provision  permitting  states  to  outlaw  union  shops,  in  re-
turn  for  urban  Democratic  votes  for  the  farm  bill.  Do  we  have
here  the  beginnings  of  an  alliance  powerful  enough  to  counteract
the  factors  making  for  farm  political  losses  and  to  shore  up  waning
farm  political  influence?  I  am  doubtful.  In  1965  the rural  Congress-
men  could  help  urban  Congressmen  obtain  a  cherished  end  of  or-
ganized  labor,  repeal  of  14(b);  even  so,  urban  Congressional  acqui-
escence  was  reportedly  very  reluctant.  Henceforth,  at  the  very  least,
urban interests  would  have  to want legislative  favors  as  substantial  as
those  the  rural  Congressmen  (assuming  that  they  are  united)  will
want.  Moreover,  rural  Congressmen  will have  fewer  votes  with  which
:iThe  Brookings  Institution,  Washington,  1963,  p.  328.
4"The  Internal  Distribution  of  Influence:  The  House,"  in  The  Congress  and
America's  Future,  David  B.  Truman,  ed.,  Prentice-Hall,  Inc.,  Englewood  Cliffs,
N.  J.,  1965,  p.  54.
85to  bargain.  Finally,  the  history  of farm-labor  logrolling  suggests  how
difficult  it  is  to  attain  anything  more  than  an ad  hoc  agreement  on
specific  issues.
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Again,  how  much  offset  for  the  probable  loss  in  farm  political
influence  may  derive  from  support  of  business  and  other  groups?
Take the  Agricultural  Conservation  Program  for example.  Successive
Presidents  have  repeatedly  tried  to  cut back  ACP  expenditures  only
to  be  overriden  by  Congress.  Approximately  one  million  farms  co-
operate  annually in  the program  which  is  administered  by the power-
ful  Agricultural  Stabilization  and  Conservation  Service  which  has
a strong vested  interest  in  its continuance.  It  has  had  a potent  ally  in
the  Soil  Conservation  Service  and  its  associated  supporters.  Turning
to business support,  the ACP also has effective  help from the National
Limestone  Institute  which  regularly  testifies  in  favor  of  ACP  ap-
propriations.  In  1962,  over  21  percent  of  ACP  payments  went  for
agricultural  limestone.
How  vital the National  Limestone  Association's  support has  been
to the continuation  of the ACP can only be guessed, but all the  condi-
tions of a  classic  example  of  effective  influence  are  present.  The  pro-
gram  spends  some  200  million  dollars  a  year,  which  makes  the
prize  worth  fighting  for,  yet  even  this  amount  is  treated  rather  cas-
ually  by  Congress  when  it  deals  with  the  6-7  billion  dollar  USDA
budget.  Moreover,  the  association  can  confine  its  energies  to  only
one  issue  on  which  decisions  are  essentially  made  in  the  Congres-
sional  appropriations  subcommittees.  Finally,  the  584  members  of
the  National  Limestone  Association  are  admirably  distributed  to
provide  local  encouragement  to  Congressmen  who  honor  the  com-
mittee decisions  to  continue  the ACP.
Another  example  is  business  combinations  associated  with  rec-
lamation  development.  Contractors,  railroads,  engineering  firms,  ce-
ment companies-these  and others are intensely interested  in reclama-
tion projects,  and so are  main street  interests which happily  anticipate
the  influx  of population,  the  growth  of business,  and  the  rise  of land
values  which  will  follow  a  shift  from  grazing  to  irrigation.  The  ac-
ceptance  of reclamation  projects  or other  similar  assistance  for  sepa-
rate  localities  requires  deals  to  provide  enough  votes.  The  result  is
5Farm and  labor  groups  rolled  logs  in  the  late  1930's,  farm  Congressmen  support-
ing  the  Wages  and  Hours  Act  of  1938  in  return  for  urban  Congressional  votes  for
the  parity  payment  features  of  the  Agricultural  Adjustment  Act  of  1938.  Subse-
quently,  rural  and  urban  votes  were  traded  in  conjoint  support  of  appropriations
for  parity  payments  and  for  work  relief.  But  both  farm  and  labor  leaders  were
anxious  to  get  legislation  which  provided  economic  assurances  or  floors  to  their
groups  without  their  having  each  year  to  go  through  the  undignified  and  risky
business  of  fighting  for  annual  appropriations.
86classic  logrolling  of which  the  Rivers  and  Harbors  Bill  is  the  proto-
type.  Logs  can  be  rolled,  of  course,  with  groups  and  interests  quite
outside agricultural  or developmental programs.  The USDA is rapidly
developing  a  "growth  industry"  of  this  type  in  the  watershed  pro-
gram  of  the  SCS.
However,  the  major question  is:  Will enough  interested  industries
-banks;  feed,  seed,  and  fertilizer  dealers;  farm  implement  com-
panies;  etc.-rally  to  the  major  price-support  and  surplus-disposal
programs  to  maintain  them  and  their  considerable  budgetary  out-
lays in the  face of the declines  in farm political  power  and  influence?
This is  a much more  difficult  question.
Walter  B.  Garver,  Manager,  Agricultural  Department,  Chamber
of  Commerce  of  the  United  States,  responded  as  follows  in  June
1965  to  a letter which  I had  sent him:
I  think  your  impression  is  reasonably  correct  that  there  is  some
increase  in  the  backing  for  policies  to  help  farmers  from  the  farm-
related  businesses.  In  my  experience,  this  is  essentially  tied to  the  fear
in rural  areas  of  community  economic  decline  which  in  some  areas  is
seen  as tied  to  the  declining  number  of  farms  and  farmers.  . . . How-
ever,  it  is  my  reading  of  this  situation  that  it  is  a  resistance  to  sharp
and  catastrophic  change  rather  than  positive  support  for  "present
policies"  that  gives  it  substance.
Norman  F.  Reber,  Secretary-Treasurer  of the  American  Agricul-
tural Editors' Association,  wrote me  in June  1965:
I  would  say  that  there  will  be  considerable  influence,  from  what
we  know  as  allied industry,  to help  the  farmer maintain  his status  and
political  power.  However,  I  do  not  believe  that  in  the  long  run  this
sort  of  influence  will  compensate  for  the  decline  of  the  more  tradi-
tional  kind  of  farm  political  power.
Douglas  Hewitt,  Executive  Secretary  of  the  Farm  and  Indus-
trial  Equipment  Institute,  sent  me  the  following  analysis  in  June
1965:
The  changes  taking  place  on  the  farm  have  certainly  frightened
many  small  town,  small  businessmen  into  supporting  any  kind  of  a
government  program  which  will  keep  a  little extra  money  flowing  into
their  communities-this  year, now-in  the  face  of  the  exodus  of  so
many  of  their  more  talented  young  people.  It  would  be  inevitable
that  a  certain  percentage  of  farm  equipment  dealers  should  share  this
sentiment.  That  larger,  more  sophisticated  companies  would  for  this
reason  change  their orientation  either  pro or  con  this  view  seems  most
unlikely; at  least  I  see  no  real evidence  indicating  such.
The  converse  of  the local  exuberance  over  the prospect  of  recla-
mation  projects  is  the  community  despair  over  the  disintegrating
economies  as barbershops,  banks,  and  businesses  take  their  turns  at
87being  "tractored"  or "consolidated"  or "soil  banked"  out of existence.
Nevertheless,  a  closer  examination  shows  that  enlargement,  consoli-
dation,  and  even  the  retirement  of farms,  while they  push people  out
of  the  country  and  toward  the  cities  and  cause  economic  pain  to
many  in  the  locality,  also  profit  others.  A  study  in  the  environs  of
Lisbon,  North  Dakota,  of 59  farms  with  all  available  acreage  in the
soil bank  was  made  in  1960-61  by the  staff  of  the agricultural  eco-
nomics  department  of  North  Dakota  State  University  under  the
leadership  of  Professor  Fred  R.  Taylor.  Findings  were  that  local
business  lost  both on  sales  of inputs  to farmers  and  on  margins  real-
ized  as handlers  or processors  of products  bought from  farmers.  Farm
implement  companies  not only  lost sales  to  farmers but suffered  from
the  fact  that  "soil  bankers"  sold  off  machinery  to  their  neighbors.
The  county's  taxes  declined.  Farmers  paid  off  loans  to  banks  and
others  and  ceased  being  customers  for credit.  But:
The  net  income  to the  operators  of  these  59  ...  farms  was  essen-
tially  the  same  after  the  soil  bank  as  before.  Most  were  pleased  and
satisfied  with  the  soil  bank  ...
Most  of  the soil  bank  income  is  being  spent  on  consumer  durables
and  non-durables  at  the  expense  of  farm  production  supplies,  equip-
ment  and  machinery."
My tentative  conclusion  is that, while farm-related  businesses  may
help  them,  the  major  price-support  programs  will  still  have  to  rely
essentially  on  the  same  sources  of  strength  that  have  sustained  them
in  the  past.  Farm-related  business  seems  too  diffuse  in  its  interest
and  too  divided  to  compensate  for  losses  in  the  size  and  solidity  of
the  farm  bloc,  in  and  out  of  Congress.  Continued  replenishment  of
the  capital  of the  Commodity  Credit  Corporation  will  surely  become
more  difficult  for  farm  politicians  who  have  lost  both  in  numbers
and in  their strategic  positions  and who  are  trying  to lead  a following
that  seems  to be  ever  more  internally  divided  and  contentious.
And yet certain  strengths  remain.  The very existence  of the  Com-
modity  Credit  Corporation  with  its  authorization  to  borrow  up  to
14.5  billion dollars  is  one of  these.  There  is  also  the  ASCS  Commit-
tee system-171  state  committeemen  who worked  113  days  in  1964,
9,183  county  committeemen  who  worked  54  days,  80,000  commun-
ity committeemen  who put in  36  days  apiece,  and  more than  15,000
full-time  office  employees-these  provide  an  impressive  vested  in-
terest.
Finally,  many  people  must  be  rather  painfully  conscious  of  the
GHearings,  Committee  on  Agriculture,  H.  of  R.,  "Wheat  and  Feed  Grains,"  98th Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  1965,  Serial  J,  pp.  620-22;  see  also  pp.  67-78,  192,  287,  300,  352.
88vulnerability  of  commercial  farming  communities  to  economic  col-
lapse  should  price-support  programs  be  suddenly  withdrawn.
HIGH  PROGRAM  COSTS  AND  FEW  BENEFICIARIES
Iowa  State  University  economists  have  recently  estimated  the
average  annual net costs  of  current farm  programs  for  1949-1963  at
$2,188,400,000.  Programs  include  only  those  aimed  at  supporting
prices,  controlling  production,  and  disposing  of  surpluses.7 Admin-
istrative  costs  which  are  not  included  were  $224,000,000  in  fiscal
1964 for the ASCS.
I  get  a  higher  figure  for  recent  years  by  analyzing  the  expendi-
tures for the USDA as part of the federal budget  (Table  1).
TABLE  1.  USDA  EXPENDITURES,  FISCAL  YEARS  1956-1963
1
1956  1957  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963
Hundred  Million  Dollars
Total  USDA  expenditures  5.2  5.0  4.9  7.1  5.4  5.9  6.7  7.7
ASCS  .2  .7  1.0  .9  .6  .7  .7  .7
Price-support  programs,  CCC  2.9  1.1  .9  2.8  1.5  1.3  2.0  3.1
P.  L.  480,  International  Wheat
Agreement,  barter  for  stockpile  .8  1.8  1.4  1.5  1.6  1.9  2.0  2.0
Section  32,  30  percent  of
tariff  receipts  .2  .2  .1  .1  .1  .2  .2  .1
Subtotal,  price  supports  3.1  3.8  3.4  5.3  3.8  3.1  4.9  5.9
Percent  price  supports  of  total  60  76  69  74  70  52  77  76
1House  of  Representatives,  Agricultural  Appropriation  Hearings,  Fiscal  1965,
Part  1, pp.  254 ff.
The  official  USDA  interpretation  differs  from  mine.  Of  USDA
expenditures  for fiscal  1964 totalling 7,897  million dollars,  the USDA
allocates  3,062  million  dollars  or  38  percent  to  programs  "pre-
dominantly for  the stabliization  of farm  incomes."  To  these  I  should
add  P.  L.  480  expenditures  under  Title  1, half  of  P.  L.  480  costs
for foreign emergency  famine relief  (on  the ground  that these  opera-
tions  also  contribute  to  the  support  of  farm  prices),  and  the  cost
of  long-term  supply  contracts.  I  should  also  add  the  cost  of  the
International  Wheat  Program,  the  barter-for-stockpile  program,  and
the  ACP.  My  total  would  be  5,059  million  dollars  or  63  percent  of
total  expenditures.
-Leo  V.  Mayer,  Earl  0.  Heady,  and  Dean  H.  Hoist,  Costs  of  Marginal Land
Retirement Programs, CAED  Rpt.  No.  23,  Iowa  State  University,  May  1965.
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the lower figures,  the costs of farm price-support  programs  are  almost
universally  conceded  to  be  high.  Then,  too,  the  concentration  of
the  farm  price-support  benefits  among  relatively  few  commercial
farmers,  which  has  been  noted  for  25  years,  is  becoming  notorious.
Table  2  shows  the  distribution  of  U.  S. farms  by  value  of  sales
and  by income  in  1964.  Just  under  one  million  farms  had  sales  of
$10,000  and  over.  As  recently  as  1955  only  583,000  farms  were  in
this  category.  Despite  the  protests  of  certain  farm  spokesmen,  the
emergence  of  a  commercial  farm  population  of  perhaps  800,000
who  produce  nearly  the  entire  commercial  agricultural  output  seems
certain  and  promises  to  be  rapid.  Indeed,  as can  be  calculated  from
Table  2,  87 percent  of the "farms"  with  sales of  less than $2,500  are
either part-time  farms or part-retirement  farms.












Income  per Farm
Operator  Family
Realized  Off-Farm
Net  Income  Income  Total
1
1  $20,000  and  over
2  $10,000  to  $19,999
3  $5,000  to  $9,999
4  $2,500  to  $4,999
5  Less than  $2,500
(5a)  Part-time
(5b)  Part  retirement
(5c)  Other
6  All  farms
Thousands Percent  Dollars  Dollars  Dollars
384  10.7  10,180  2,177  12,357
594  16.6  6,207  1,512  7,719
609  17.0  3,731  1,778  5,509
463  13.0  2,337  2,080  4,417
1,523  42.7  1,029  3,222  4,251
903  25.3  919  4,450  5,369
418  11.7  1,086  1,880  2,966
202  5.7  1,406  510  1,916
3,573  100.0  3,504  2,431  5,935
1Includes  nonmoney  income  from  food  and  housing.
SOURCE:  Economic  Research  Service,  U.  S.  Department  of  Agriculture,  Farm Income  Situation, November  1964.
In  view  of  these  figures,  the  estimated  distribution  of  govern-
mental payments to farmers in  1963 confirms  our expectations.  About
11  percent  of  all  farms  had  annual  sales  of  $20,000  and  over,  re-
ceived  governmental  payments  averaging  $2,391  per  farm,  and  ac-
counted  for  54.5  percent  of  the total.  On  the  other  hand,  42.5  per-
cent  of  the  farms  with  less  than  $2,500  sales  averaged  only  $51  in
government  payments  per  farm  and  accounted  for  only  4.6  per-
cent  of  the  total payments  (Table  3).
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-TABLE  3.  GOVERNMENT  PAYMENTS  TO  AGRICULTURE
(ESTIMATES,  1963)
Di
Farms  With  Sales
$20,000  and  over
$10,000  to  $19,999
$5,000  to  $9,999
$2,500  to  $4,999
Less  than  $2,500
Total
c
istribution  Government  Payments
)f Farms  Total  Per Farm  Distribution
Million
Dollars  Dollars  Dollars  Percent
















The  concentration  of  benefits  can  also  be  shown  from  the
USDA's  calculations  on  income  parity  for  farmers.  This  method
discloses  a tremendous  gap between  "parity  income"  and  what  most
farmers  actually  receive  (Table  4).




Farm  Group  for  Parity
Percent
400,000  farms  selling  $20,000  or  more  of  products  2
600,000  farms  selling  between  $10,000  and  $20,000  10
600,000  farms  selling  between  $5,000  and  $10,000  34
450,000  farms  selling  between  $2,500  and  $5,000  75
At first,  these  figures  seem to  confirm  that the price-support  pro-
gram  is,  indeed,  a  program  in  the  interest  of  a  class. In  1933  we
talked of the disparity in incomes  of agriculture  as  a sector compared
to the rest of the  economy;  and occasionally  we continue  in the same
vein. Today,  however,  the welfare  of the  commercial  farmer  appears
to  be  the  essential  aim  of  the  price-support  program.  The  USDA
emphasizes  the debt the  consumer  owes  to agriculture  and  especially
the  interest  of the  consumer  in  the commercial  farmer.
Actually,  the  class  orientation  of  agricultural  policy  is  nothing
new.  All who remember  the  travail  of the Farm  Security Administra-
tion have  seen the  evidence  that  many  of  the power  holders  in agri-
culture  have  long  been  either  fearful  of  systematic  efforts  to  reach
91a helping  hand  to the  rural  farm  poor  or  else  have  simply  been  in-
different  to their existence.
Given  the  strong  strategic  positions  in  Congress  which  certain
agricultural interests  have  traditionally  enjoyed,  the programs  may be
politically  sustained  to an important  extent  by the small  benefits  that
they  regularly  distribute  to  large  numbers  of  farmers.  The  situation
in  cotton  illustrates  both  of  these  qualifications.  At  the  request  of
Congressman  Weitner  (D.,  Georgia),  the  USDA  supplied  data  on
distribution  of  benefits  in  the  cotton  program  for  1961.  Allotments
were  held  by  928,761  farmers  of  whom  70  percent  had  allotments
of  10  acres  or  less  and  received  an  average  subsidy  benefit  of  $63.
On the other hand,  322 farms with allotments of  1,000  acres or more
received  an  average  subsidy  benefit  of  $113,657.  The  windfalls  of
the  wealthy  may well  be  politically  sustained  by  the  pittances  to  the
poor.
When  the  increasing  concentration  of  benefits  among  the  "elite"
group  become  more  widely known  and  remembered,  an  agricultural
price  policy  heavily  based  upon  subventions  may  become  very  diffi-
cult to maintain.
Now  there  are  two  arguments  against  this  spotlighting  of  the
elite  and  of the  extraordinary  benefits  that it  derives  from  farm  pro-
grams.  The  first  has  already  been  suggested  but  should  be  made
explicit.  Walter  Wilcox  wrote  me  in  August  1965:  "When  the  per
capita  cost  of  the  farm  program  is  added  to  consumers'  per  capita
expenditures  for  food  they  spend  a  substantially smaller proportion
of  their  income  for  these  items  than  consumers  in  other  countries
spend  for food  alone."
The  argument  that  Americans  could  afford  to  pay  somewhat
more for  their  food  may still  be  well  taken; however,  the  contention
that  the  cost  of  price  supports  should  therefore  simply  be  added  to
consumer costs  misses  the  point that  the  derivation  and  allocation  of
governmental  expenditures  create  special  problems  which  have  an
economic  aspect  but are  essentially  political.  On the  side  of  creating
public funds  or  income  streams  one has  to  consider  many  economic
effects,  e.g.,  the  impact  on  the  economy  of  additional  taxes,  espe-
cially  the  impact  on  wealth,  on  expenditures,  or  on  income  streams
of  various  groups;  hence  a  political  effect.  On  the  expenditure  side,
one  has the  competing  demands  of  the  several  claimants  to  the  more
negotiable  part of his  budget.  Thus,  the  argument  that farm  program
costs  and  the  concentration  of public  benefits  among  the  few  should
be  overlooked  because  Americans  pay  a  very  small  fraction  of  their
budget  for food is not very convincing.
92The  other  argument-that  an  immediate  or  even  a  rapid  re-
moval  of governmental  price  programs  would  be  disastrous  for com-
mercial  agriculture-is  more  telling,  especially  when  the  argument
is  reinforced  by  analyses  of  the  potential  productivity  which  is  in-
herent  in  the  nature  of  the  present  state  of  the  arts.  According  to
Walter Wilcox, realized  net farm income,  in the absence of price  sup-
ports  and  acreage  diversion  programs,  would  drop  52  percent.
Donald  R.  Kaldor  believes  that "total  net farm  income  would  drop
sharply  during  a  transition  period  to  free  markets."  He  considers
that  the  drop  toward  the  end  of  the period  might  be  about  25  per-
cent,  assuming  some  acceleration  in  the  decline  of  farm  numbers.
Whereas  Dr.  Wilcox  expects  during  the  transition  period  "farm
mechanization,  farm  consolidation,  and  off-farm  migration  probably
would  be  slowed  down,"  Professor  Kaldor  looks  for  "some  increase
in the rate of decline  of farm numbers"  and a  "likely  acceleration  in
the decline  in farm population."
On  top  of  the  threatened  decline  in  farm  incomes  if  price-sup-
port  programs  are  rapidly  withdrawn  is  the  threat  from  galloping
technology. Dr. Wilcox  avers that in the last five  years "the  increased
use  of  fertilizers  and  associated  practices  have  added  the  equivalent
of 25,000,000 crop acres to our productive  capacity."
FARM  POLITICS  AND FOREIGN  POLICY
Congress  faces  cruel  dilemmas  in domestic  farm  policy,  and  the
temptation  is  strong  to  seek  relief  in  foreign  markets  and  at  the
expense  of  foreign  competition.  The  first  dilemma  seems  to  be  the
choice  between  continuing  present  price-support  programs  with  the
consequent  enrichment  of an  elite  or  abandoning  them with  the  risk
of impoverishment  to commercial  agriculture  and the virtual  certainty
of a deflation  in land values.  The second dilemma  is the contradiction
between  the  results  that  may  be  obtained  from  acreage  diversion
programs  when  the  equivalent  of  five  million  acres  of  cropland  is
being  added  annually  to  the  agricultural  base  through  additional
use  of  fertilizers  and  related  practices.  The  more  cropland  diversion
succeeds  in raising  farm  prices,  the  greater  the  incentive  to increase
inputs on  the  land  remaining  in production.
So  the politicians  have  returned  to the  export  market  to help  get
rid  of farm  surpluses.  The Agricultural  Trade  Development  and  As-
sistance Act of 1954, Public Law 480, marked an effort by the United
States  to expand  exports.  This law  has  expanded  to include  "foreign
policy,  humanitarian  assistance,  and  economic  development"  as  well
as  to  provide  "an  outlet  for  current  and  future  U.  S.  agricultural
products." Through  fiscal year  1962 over  9  billion dollars  in  agricul-
93tural  products  were  shipped  under  P.  L.  480  programs-or  nearly
30  percent  of  all  agricultural  exports.  Approximately  twice  that
much  in  value  was  programmed.
Since  1961  a  combination  of  vigorous  foreign  disposal  of  feed
grains,  higher  feed  consumption  by  more  livestock,  and  (in  1964)
unfavorable  weather,  helped  reduce  feed  grain  carryovers.  But  con-
tinued  expansion  of  cotton  carryovers  may  explain  the  heightened
Congressional  interest  in  pushing  sales  abroad  and  in  preventing
the rise in foreign  competition for American  farm products. Thus,  the
Report  of  the  House  Committee  on  Appropriations  on  the  Agricul-
tural  Appropriation  Bill  for  fiscal  1965  states:  "In  the  opinion  of
the  Committee,  it  is  far  better  to  use  taxpayers'  money  to  improve
American  Agriculture  and  protect  the  American  Consumer  than
to  provide  training  and  technical  assistance  to  our  competitors  in
world  agricultural  markets  through  the  Agency for  International  De-
velopment."  No  USDA  funds,  said  the  report,  "should  be  used  to
promote  or  assist  in  promoting  overseas  production  of  any  agricul-
tural  commodity"  which  is  "affected  by  any  price  support  program
in  the  United  States."  Since  all  U.  S. farm  products  presumably  are
affected  by price  supports,  the  proscription  is  universal.
In  1965  the  Agricultural  Appropriations  Subcommittee  returned
to  the  same  theme  in  discussions  in  the  hearings  as  well  as  in  the
report  to  the  House of the  Committee  on  Appropriations.  The  report
declared  that the United States,  like  "most exporting  nations,"  should
sell what  it produces  and does  not  need  "for  what  it will  bring  in  the
world  markets."  The  Committee  "insists"  among  other  things  that
the  United  States  announce  each  year  the  quantity  of  cotton  it  will
sell,  presumably  for whatever  cotton will bring, on  the world markets.
When  such  sales  quotas  are  connected  with  price-support  programs
that  stimulate  production  with  the  residue  being  sold  abroad  for
whatever  it will bring,  the effect  is dumping.
For  much  of  our  agricultural  history  the  fiat  of  such  directives
from  the  Appropriations  Committee  would,  indeed,  have  been  law.
But  the  situation  may  have  changed  perhaps  because  of  factors
already  noted  indicating  the  weakening  of  the  traditional  vested
position  of  agriculture  in  the  nation's  politics  and  perhaps  also  be-
cause  of  the  strength  of  the  administration  with  its  two-thirds  Con-
gressional  majority  and  a  President  unparalleled  in  his  stamina,  in
his  skill,  and  in  his  exhaustive  knowledge  of  U.  S. politics.
What  we  are  witnessing  may  be  a  repetition  of  executive  surges
into  superior  positions  in  farm  policy  such  as  occurred  in  1933,  in
1949,  and in 1954,  only to  be followed  by the  reassertion of Congres-
94sional  dominance-although  the  Congressional  base  upon  which
a  return  to  superiority  would  have  to be built  has  now  been  greatly
weakened.
The  moves  of  the  administration  in  1965  seem  compatible  with
a  re-examination  of  the  agricultural  aspects  of  U.  S. foreign  policy
such as  the  National Agricultural  Advisory  Commission  called  for in
1964.  The NAAC  praised  the  concept  of  P.  L.  480  and  noted  the
great  need  of many  countries  for  food.  With  respect  to  provision  of
U. S. farm produce to developing countries,  however,  the NAAC  said:
The  controlling  consideration  should  be  the  long-run  contribution
food  can  make  to  the  economic  development,  political  stability,  and
general  welfare  of  the  recipient  countries.  Extremely  difficult  judg-
ments  must be  made  as  to when  food will  serve  such  purposes  without
undermining  the  expansion  of  underdeveloped  countries'  own  agricul-
ture or  making large  numbers  of  people  dependent  on  gift-like  supplies
of  food  that  cannot  be  sustained.
Whatever  detailed  conclusions  will  come  out  of  re-examining
"agricultural"  foreign  policy,  one  general  finding  seems  clear  in  ad-
vance.  The  developing  countries  must  essentially  rely  upon  them-
selves.  The  1959  Report  on  India's Food Crisis and the  Steps  to
Meet  It  estimated  the  additional  food  India  would  require  to  feed
its  growing population  and  declared:  "No  conceivable  programme  of
imports or  rationing  could  meet  a  crisis  of this  magnitude."8 During
1954-1961,  U.  S.  concessional  sales  to  India  "have  represented  a
gross  average  per  capita intake  daily  of  77  calories,  which  compares
with  an  estimated  daily per  capita  intake  of  2,050  calories  in  1958
and  1959." ' That is, the U. S. provided  3.7 percent of India's calories.
The meaning  is  unmistakable:  India-and it is  only the best  example
of the  universal  situation-must  feed  its  own.
We  can  help  with  exports  of food  and  other  capital.  But  we  can
help chiefly through sharing with India  and other developing  countries
the tremendous  resources  available  in our agricultural  scientific  estab-
lishment.  Our  own  experience  defines  the  need.  The  miracle  of
American  agricultural  production and  efficiency  is  a product of many
factors  in  synergistic  combination,  but  one  of  its  main  sources  is
agricultural  science.
Let  me  emphasize  the  extent  of  the need  for trained  agricultural
researchers  and  teachers.  Colombia,  a  nation  of  15-16  million,  has
three  colleges  of  agricluture  which  graduate  each  year  80-90  in-
8Government  of  India,  New  Delhi,  April  1959,  p.  13.
9George  Allen,  Economics, Politics, and Agricultural Surpluses,  The  Agricultural
Economics  Society,  1962,  p.  15.
95genioros agronomos,  roughly  the  equivalent  of  our  bachelors  of
science.  With  about  half  her population  in  agriculture  Colombia  has
a  rural  farm  sector  roughly  comparable  in  numbers  to  that  of  the
U.  S.  with  195  million.  In  1963-64  the  U.  S. graduated  7,050  with
B.S.  degrees  in  agriculture  and  closely  related  disciplines,  1,859
with M.A. degrees,  and 569 with Ph.D.  degrees.
No  doubt developing  countries  need  help  chiefly  in planting  and
nourishing  science  through their own  institutions.  But  as  is shown  by
the  Colombian  experience  (and,  indeed,  our  own,  if  one  goes  back
far  enough),  these  will  take  some  time  to  grow.  Meanwhile  U.  S.
colleges  of  agriculture  offer  great  resources  for  providing  part  of
the  training  of  developing  country  students  and,  indirectly,  for  as-
sisting developing  country  institutions.  The demand  on U.  S. colleges
is  already  great.  In  major  colleges  of  agriculture  one-third  to  one-
half  of  the  graduate  students  may  come  from  abroad,  mostly  from
developing  countries.
Fortunately,  a  statesmanlike  move  is  in  the  making  to  provide
the financial  sinews for international  service.  Senator  George  McGov-
ern  and  thirteen  other  senators  introduced  S.  1212  in  February
1965,  to  provide  a  permanent  authorization  modeled  on  the  Hatch
Act  of  1887  for  federal  aid  to  universities  which  would  establish
programs  for international  assistance  through  research,  training,  and
development.
CONCLUSIONS-AND  A  LARGER  SIGNIFICANCE
Let  us  return  to  the  beginning.  We  see  a  decline  in  traditional
farm  political  power  in  the  United  States,  also  the  growing  travail
of  farm  policy  with  heavy  governmental  costs,  benefits  increasingly
concentrated among the few, the enrichment-impoverishment  dilemma,
and  the  acreage  diversion-technological  upsurge  dilemma.  Agricul-
tural  political  forces  in  Congress  are  increasingly  turning  to  foreign
markets  and  the  manipulation  of  foreign  trade  to  cure  the  ills  of
domestic agriculture.
Currently,  rising economic  and political  difficulties of the develop-
ing  world  suggest  a  re-examination  of  U.  S.  policy  toward  poorer
countries.  There,  a  prime  objective  must  be  to  increase  rates  of
growth,  especially  in  agricultural  sectors.  Since  agricultural  produc-
tivity stems  largely  from  applied  science,  we  look  to  our  colleges  of
agriculture for expanded  service  in the cause  of overseas  development.
To  this end,  a conscious broadening  of purpose in the  minds  of edu-
cational  leaders  plus  adjustments  in  their institutions  may well  have
memorable  effects.
96But there is a larger significance! One  way  or another,  the United
States  will  wrestle  with  the  problems  of  the  world.  In  so  doing  our
missions abroad must reflect our expertise; but equally important, they
should  reflect  something  of  our  constitutional  balances.  If  we  are
going  to  be  inexorably  intertwined  throughout  the  world,  more  of
the  institutions  that  go  to make  up the  United  Sates  should  be  there,
equally  sinewed  and  provisioned.  What  I  am  suggesting  clearly  in-
volves the systematic,  "permanent"  extension abroad of our institutions
as well as technicians.  If this development comes about  our universities
will be projected abroad in programs that root back into the American
educational  establishment  with  its century  of loyalties  and  its wealth
of influential connections.
Along  with  the  arcanum  of diplomacy  and  the military  missions
we  need  full  representation  overseas  in  the  arts  and  science  of  civil
living and  development.
Are we to continue economic and technical assistance  but carefully
refrain  from  conveying  any  of  our cultural  values?  Are  we  to  resist
communism  only  militarily?  The  Chinese  Communists  project  the
full  thrust  of  their philosophy,  their  deepest  beliefs.  We  will  hardly
abandon  the  field  to  them.  If we  compete  with  them,  we  will  surely
carry our values along.
We can discipline  ourselves  by consciously  limiting  our  efforts  to
intrude  our  values  and  standards  on an  alien  people.  To  limit,  how-
ever,  is not to  eliminate.  I  should  argue  that our  own beliefs  require
of us  a minimum  conduct  of  exemplifying  in  word  and  deed  so  far
as  our abilities  permit,  but within  prudent  limits,  that respect  for the
individual which  is  really at  the heart of our  basic  political beliefs.
Now  we  are  told that respect  for  the  individual  is  unique  to  the
Judaeo-Christian  tradition  and that in those parts of the world  where
this tradition  does not  prevail,  the  idea  of an individual  as  a morally
cognizant  and accountable  single person endowed  with  rights  is  unin-
telligible  or nearly  so.  My  own experience  in  alien  cultures  still con-
vinces  me  that  there  are  men  everywhere  who  yearn  to  live  under
what  we  call the  "rule of law"-the  idea that the state's  power  must
never be brought  to bear  arbitrarily  against  anyone,  that  rulers  must
give accounting,  and that loyalty  does  not  require bending  the  neck.
This idea is that part of mankind's intellectual  and  moral heritage
which happens  to be our  trust.  Perhaps  it has  been  a  mistake  to  try
to impose  this idea  in the  past,  and  certainly  efforts  to  impose  it  in
the future will court frustration.  But we can  do no less than exemplify
our  ideals;  and,  if  asked,  we  can  attempt  to  help  others  put  them
into effect.
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